

**RC** THE RĪGA  
CONFERENCE

Latvian Transatlantic Organisation

**2021**



## **POLICY BRIEF**

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# **CITIUS, ALTIUS, FORTIUS? AFGHANISTAN, NATO 2030 AND THE 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT**

Julian Lindley-French

# **THE RĪGA CONFERENCE**

## **POLICY BRIEF**

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## **The Rīga Conference Policy Briefs Introductory Remarks**

Dear the Rīga Conference Participants, Dear Readers,

In 2021, international relations have still been sailing in troubled waters, and further answers have been sought to issues related to the long-term impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on global development.

This year, on the one hand, existing triggers have augmented: rapid developments and power shift in Afghanistan with potentially global consequences; Russia's escalation of tension and sabre-rattling at the Ukrainian border; increasing confrontation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority; and an irresponsible behaviour by the Belarusian regime. On the other hand, also the issues long in the focus of international agenda have retained their urgency: competition among global and regional powers; increasing risks to international rule of law and democratic values; climate change; the diverse faces of the migration challenge; the ever-increasing role of new technologies in tackling foreign policy matters; and the fight against disinformation.

It still calls for a responsible and broad-based approach on the part of the international community to achieve results conducive to global development and security. The further implementation of the European Green Deal policy and the NATO reflection process 2030 have been significant contribution to this end.

International processes are growing increasingly sophisticated and intricate, when alongside a classical approach to diplomacy foreign policy makers and implementers are expected to come up with swift, unconventional and creative, while at the same time sustainable and effective solutions. They demonstrate the need for a more inclusive approach that results

in even more governmental and non-governmental actors being engaged in foreign policy.

I wish the readers of the Rīga Conference Policy Briefs to continue enriching their insights and knowledge of regional and global foreign policy processes and be active in generating new ideas on their path towards that goal.

**Edgars Rinkēvičs**

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia



## Rīga Conference Policy Briefs Introductory Remarks

“Peace” is defined as “a period in which there is no war”<sup>1</sup> or “freedom from disturbance; tranquility”<sup>2</sup>. Like before, this year, globally, there were neither. While there have been breakthroughs in combating the COVID pandemic with vaccination roll-out and major economic stimuli from governments, the virus is continuing to disturb our daily lives. The war in Eastern Ukraine is still ongoing as Ukraine battles for its’ territorial integrity, while in Georgia the same fight has become a frozen conflict. The hybrid warfare is maturing and becoming more complex as demonstrated by Lukashenko’s regime in hijacking the Ryanair flight, as well as in orchestrating the recent breaches of Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish borders by brutally using innocent, misled people as hybrid warfare tools. There is little tranquility in our societies. Dis-information continued to be a troublesome weapon throughout the year and it has fueled further divisions among people with anti-vaccination campaigns being the most prominent theme. The attack on the U.S. Capitol in the beginning of the year, the rise of conspiracy theories and populism are clear symptoms of confused, scared and/or angry people.

Existing security challenges, such as Russia’s opportunism and constant military build-up, uncertainty of terrorism threats boosted by the Taliban take-over in Afghanistan, unpredictable climate cataclysms, together with emerging challenges related to advancements in technology and supply chain vulnerabilities will only add to this unrest, this state in-between peace and war.

As a result, demand for security will continue to increase. And Western democracies must be able to deliver. Winston Churchill once famously said:

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<sup>1</sup> Oxford Languages

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

“Never let a good crisis go to waste”. Thus, we must learn the lessons and act decisively to ensure security – to ensure that our democracies are prepared and capable to overcome whatever might come our way. To ensure that our societies feel safe and become more resilient in the face of ever evolving challenges. In this endeavor Western democracies need to do more and together to achieve true peace.

Open discussion, exchange of knowledge and ideas can certainly help to seek answers on how to do it better and I believe this year’s Riga Conference will be a valuable opportunity to do so.

**Artis Pabriks**

Minister of Defence of the Republic of Latvia



**CITIUS, ALTIUS, FORTIUS?  
AFGHANISTAN, NATO 2030 AND  
THE 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT**

Professor Julian Lindley-French

“In any moment of decision, the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing”.

**President Theodore Roosevelt**

## **ABSTRACT**

Citius, altius, fortius? In April 2008, I was despatched to write a high-level report entitled *“Afghanistan: The Way Ahead in the South”*. The report remains confidential but its final two sentences were prophetic. “Some countries forgive mediocrity. Afghanistan is no such country”. The defeat in Afghanistan has put NATO’s 2030 challenge in stark relief and revealed what is the perhaps the most powerful ‘weapon’ with which the Alliance needs to re-arm itself – trust in each other. The events in Afghanistan will have profound implications for the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept and the NATO 2030 Agenda. Given the unfortunate context of the Afghanistan defeat, and the threats and challenges the NATO 2030 Agenda calls on the Alliance to address, both from a fast-changing strategic environment and potentially transformative emerging and disruptive technologies, the Alliance’s peace-preserving mission will only prevail if NATO adopts the Olympic motto, citius, altius, fortius (faster, higher, stronger) and for once mean it. The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept must thus set a level of strategic ambition commensurate with the ‘threat curve’ or fail in a world transformed since 2010. Back then, the November 2010 NATO Strategic Concept established the three core tasks, collective defence, crisis management and co-operative security which were given an equality of relevance. This was partly due to the “unpredictable world” with which NATO had to contend with, but also because the nations had contending interests. Today,



the world is far more predictably dangerous. In 2021, whilst the nations still have contending interests the 2022 Strategic Concept must also be unequivocal if it is to pass the 2021 Riga Test and thus ensure the good citizens of Latvia can sleep soundly in their beds over the coming decade. That means credible collective deterrence and defence for the entirety of the Alliance is now the absolute and clear priority and NATO must be modernised to meet all and any such challenge from all and any state using all and any means. That will mean a warfighter NATO, no ifs, no buts. The principle lesson of Afghanistan? The Alliance and its can no longer continue to delude itself by avoiding inconvenient strategic truths or that words alone mean deeds. Therefore, the essential challenge implicit in both NATO Agenda 2030 and thus the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept is not simply about how to make marginal adaptations but to transform the Alliance for the coming decade, and to do so in the midst of the post-COVID 19 economic crisis. For that to happen Europeans must finally come of age as strategic actors. The real proof of NATO 2030 will be the creation of a high-end, first responder, multi-domain European future force able to deter and defend in its own right. Some ages forgive strategic mediocrity. This is no such age. Citius, Altius, Fortius NATO Europe!

## **SWANS AND ELEPHANTS**

Last year, in another policy paper for this conference, I quoted Professor Paul Cornish. “The real threat to NATO and its cohesion are Black Elephants; risks that are widely acknowledged and familiar (the ‘elephant in the room’) but ignored. When the elephant can no longer be ignored it is passed off as an unpredictable surprise (a ‘black swan’) by those who were slow to address it. NATO’s biggest Black Elephant is the reluctance of its member countries to spend on defence.” Spending is commitment. That prediction is now playing out as Allied political leaders scramble to limit the political and strategic damage to themselves of the defeat in Afghanistan. At a recent meeting of *The Alphen Group* of which I have the honour to chair, a former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (DSACEUR) posed the fundamental question NATO must answer if its defence and deterrence posture is to remain credible

over the coming decade: does the Alliance have the political will and military wherewithal to successfully organise for the multi-domain fight that it now faces? In other words, can NATO again be a credible AND relevant warfighter? Deterrence and defence will depend on it. The fiasco in Afghanistan would suggest not because ultimately the defeat therein is a failure of high-level political will caused by a refusal of leaders to face inconvenient truths and thus a fundamental mismatch between policy, politics and strategy. This author wrote three strategic reports on Afghanistan including one in which he was sent around the world to talk to the Chiefs of Defence and their staffs of those countries with troops in the most hotly-contested area, Regional Command, South. The report remains confidential but the essential finding as early as 2008 was that unless political words were matched with a much more determined effort to harmonise the Alliance and NATO-wide effort, together with all the capacities, capabilities, rules of engagement and metrics therein, the campaign would in time fail. It has.

It is against that backdrop of failure and the mismatch between ends, ways and means in Afghanistan and Allied rhetoric and reality that the 2021 Riga Conference takes place. The core message of this policy is blunt: both the NATO 2030 Agenda, which emerged from the report by the NATO Reflection Group *NATO 2030: Unified for a New Era* led by Wess Mitchell and Thomas de Maizière together with the forthcoming 2022 Strategic Concept must be seen in the context of the post-Afghanistan, possibly post-COVID strategic peer competitor challenge of China and Russia and thus seek to answer the question this paper has posed. If NATO is on a slippery slope to potential disaster. It is a challenge addressed by my new Oxford book *Future War and the Defence of Europe*, which I have had the honour to co-write with General (Ret.) John R. Allen and Lt. General (Ret) Ben Hodges <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/future-war-and-the-defence-of-europe-9780198855835?c-c=nl&lang=en&>. The book addresses NATO's the dangerous paradox at the heart of NATO adaptation; the all-too apparent but routinely ignored mismatch between ends, ways and means which was all too apparent in Afghanistan throughout the campaign and the profound lack of unity of effort and purpose that undermined it, whatever the many soothing words issued in too many NATO declarations and communiques over too many years.

Let me be clear, **the defeat in Afghanistan IS a disaster and not just for the tragedy of suffering to which the people of Afghanistan are again being subjected. It is also a massive blow to the credibility of the West because of what it reveals about the vacuous political culture at the heart of the Alliance that is far more about appearance than substance, political optics more than defence realities.** The Biden administration's mantra that "America is back" now lies in tatters and, in spite of the hand-wringing, most European political leaders are simply relieved that their forces are out of Afghanistan and that they can blame the Americans. The danger now is that Europeans will avoid proper scrutiny for their own many failings in Afghanistan precisely to hide the extent of the crisis at the heart of NATO, much if it due to the political and military weakness and strategic pretence of Britain, France and Germany. The self-serving political narrative is now apparent: Afghanistan was excruciatingly complex, extremely expensive, impossibly corrupt and domestically unpopular. Moreover, the campaign was US-led and when the Americans decided to go, Europeans had no alternative but to leave. Throughout the campaign the mantra was always 'NATO in together-out together' and yet NATO leaders were strangely silent when President Trump announced that he planned to negotiate with the Taliban on behalf of all the Alliance. They were also silent when the British called for Europeans to stay in Afghanistan after the US has departed, although the British never formally tabled the proposal which suggests either a complete lack of support amongst the European Allies, or the British were never really serious about staying, or both. The consequence will not only be that others will no longer believe in either the Americans or the Alliance as reliable partners, but that the Alliance will no longer really believe in itself with profound implications for NATO Agenda 2030 and the 2022 Strategic Concept. If that happens NATO will be reduced to being little more than a summit declaration drafting agency preparing meaningless words on behalf of spineless leaders.

The defeat in Afghanistan also begs a further question, what exactly is the purpose of the 2022 Strategic Concept? To quote NATO, "A Strategic Concept is an official document that outlines NATO's enduring purpose and nature, and its fundamental security tasks. It also identifies the central

features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's approach to security and provides guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces".<sup>1</sup> The 2022 Strategic Concept will necessarily build on the NATO 2030 Agenda which, as the June 2021 NATO Summit Communique states, "...sets a higher level of ambition for NATO", and, "...provides clear guidelines for further adaptation to address existing, new and future threats and challenges, building on the ongoing political and military adaptation of the Alliance".<sup>2</sup>

There can be no denying (although some leaders will no doubt try) that the defeat in Afghanistan marks a strategic inflection point for the Alliance, but if that is the case what precisely does it imply? Will NATO ever collectively modernise the Article 5 defence and deterrence posture sufficiently to match advances in Chinese and Russian capabilities? Will the European members of the Alliance collectively modernise their military capabilities to both maintain vital interoperability with the future-tech, future US force? Are Europeans capable of giving some semblance of credibility to European 'strategic autonomy'? Will the US be able to continue to offset wilful European military weakness and maintain its security guarantee to Europe whilst also fulfilling its increasingly onerous global commitments? Above all, will NATO leaders have the political courage to draw the real lessons from the Afghanistan defeat or will flocks of black swans fly over herds of black elephants...again?

## **NATO 2030: UNITED FOR A NEW ERA?**

In the space of a few dark weeks in Afghanistan the challenge implicit in the NATO 2030 Agenda has thus grown exponentially. The NATO Reflection Group (NRG) was established at a pivotal moment in transatlantic relations and because of that *NATO 2030: United for a New Era*<sup>3</sup> sought to strike a delicate balance between the twin threats posed by Russia, the

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<sup>1</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_56626.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm)

<sup>2</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en)

<sup>3</sup> NATO 2030: Unified for a New Era [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf)

dangerous instability faced by the Alliance to NATO's south, which will now increase, growing pressures on the Americans, and the many frictions and factions within and between the Allies. The core mission of the NRG was to enhance the future political and military cohesion of the Alliance upon which credible deterrence and defence and security engagement necessarily rest. **However, political cohesion can and will only ever be realised if there is a sufficiency of shared political will and strategic ambition and that in turn demands alignment between the interests and values of all the Allies.** The 2022 Strategic Concept in a sense operationalises the Agenda and for that reason will perhaps be the most important Allied document since the MC14/3, "The Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Area" of 1967. However, will it ever be acted upon? So often in the past NATO has issued grand declarations only for the nations to then steadily slide away from their commitments, most notably the NATO 2014 Wales Summit Declaration and the Defence Investment Pledge. And, whilst some progress was made at the subsequent Warsaw and Brussels summits in 2016 and 2018 respectively, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that

**“the rate of pace of NATO adaptation is far slower than the pace of change and emerging threat**

The defeat in Afghanistan has put such dissonance and political sleight of hand into sharp relief. Therefore, the essential challenge implicit in NATO Agenda 2030 and thus the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept will not be one of how to better adapt the Alliance for the coming decade, but to transform it and to do so in the midst of the post-COVID 19 economic crisis. Anything less will be inadequate, possibly catastrophically so.

Given that challenge it is important that the first principles of the Strategic Concept are established early so that it addresses the challenge of tomorrow, not today or even yesterday. For all the talk of preparing NATO for the future the drafting of such concepts is inherently far more political than strategic and the political tendency is always to stick to generalities to avoid upsetting the politics of the here and now. Back in November 2010 the then

*New NATO Strategic Concept* established three core tasks for the Alliance collective defence, crisis management and co-operative security which at the time were given equality of relevance. This was partly due to the “unpredictable world” with which NATO had to contend with, but also because Allied nations had many contending interests. They still do. Indeed, it is worth quoting the 2010 Strategic Concept in some length because given the economic, banking and Eurozone crises of the time and egregious cuts that were being made to NATO defence budgets at the time the language therein bore little relation to the reality. It was at that point that the NATO Afghanistan campaign ran out of steam, even as the Alliance took on more tasks, the same old story. The 2010 Strategic Concept stated:

“a. *Collective defence.* NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.

b. *Crisis management.* NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.

c. *Cooperative security.* The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards”.

Really?

## PERMA-WAR

Fast forward to 2021 and the political, security, defence and economic dimensions of the Alliance still remain deeply intertwined. However, since 2010 the world has changed profoundly with Great Power Competition having returned with a vengeance. Back in 2010 it was safe to assume the US was the sole superpower which gave the Alliance some leeway for complacency. Now there are two superpowers and only one of them is mired in deep debt. In 2021 China is overtly challenging the United States and deliberately seeking to complicate America's already complex strategic dilemma by over-extending American commitments to its many allies and partners the world-over stretching America's already taut armed forces ever further. Add to that the loss of American prestige and trust in the United States with the failure of the twenty year mission to Afghanistan and NATO's strategic challenge has been compounded for without a confident outward-looking United States at the core of the Alliance it becomes adrift. For example, the mega-insurgencies of Al Qaeda and Islamic State might appear to be diminished, but as the deadly August 27<sup>th</sup> attack by ISIS-K on *Hamid Karzai International Airport* demonstrated they are far from over and the force of Salafist Jihadism are growing again across swathes of Europe's near neighbourhood. **The loss of prestige of both the US and NATO in Afghanistan will doubtless further encourage another surge of jihadi extremism and make it harder to build enduring and stable partnerships with states beyond the Alliance that are vital to the security of the southern Allies in particular.**

In 2010, the Alliance was also hoping that the NATO-Russia Council would lead to a more co-operative relationship with Moscow in spite of Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia. And then came Ukraine. In 2014, Russia seized Crimea changing a nominally settled border in Europe through force of arms for the first time since World War Two. In July 2014 Russian forces also shot down a Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 with the loss of 298 souls, many of them Dutch. Repentant? Not a bit of it, partly because Europe's response was a case study in irresolution dressed up as sanction. As the July 2021 *National Secu-*

*Strategy of the Russian Federation* all too clearly attests Moscow remains committed to strategic competition with the Alliance including the prosecution of an aggressive policy of intimidation and implied threat against its neighbours, whilst Belarus is ever more an autocratic puppet of Russia.<sup>4</sup> Put simply, Russia is determined to extend its sphere of influence by all means available to it across the 5Ds of what is fast becoming ‘perma-war’ on NATO’s eastern flank, the applied application in strategy of deception, disinformation, destabilisation, disruption and implied and actual destruction. Perma-war marks one of the many mismatches between the Russian elite and its European neighbours. Whilst Western Europe in particular is facing a crisis of self-confidence and will do all it can to avoid threat even if that means Allies and partners must live with greater risk, the only thing keeping the Putin regime in power is the use of such exaggerated threat. The consequence is a crisis of deterrence in the Alliance caused by Western European selfishness and US over-stretch that is inexorably leading to increased risk on NATO’s borders.

The bandwidth of war is also expanding. Perma-war is also part of a new spectrum of hybrid, cyber and hyperwar in which the very nature and concept of war is expanding and will continue to expand over the coming decade changing its character profoundly from the offensive use of destabilising information and interference to the threat of all-out war.

**“The essence of perma-war is the continuous exploitation of the vulnerabilities of free, open societies to generate the effects sought by Beijing, Moscow and others.”**

It is made possible because much of Europe’s leadership, particularly in Western Europe, is in denial. The result is not so much deterrence by denial but deterrence in denial. Moreover, at the high-end of threat and conflict, and thus the ultimate challenge and test for Alliance deterrence and defence, new

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<sup>4</sup> [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352947309\\_National\\_Security\\_Strategy\\_of\\_the\\_Russian\\_Federation\\_2021](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352947309_National_Security_Strategy_of_the_Russian_Federation_2021)



emerging and disruptive technologies are fast entering the ever-expanding battlespace from sea-bed to space rapidly accelerating the conduct of war. It is thus precisely to meet that challenge that the very idea of NATO deterrence and defence must be transformed if the Alliance is to carry out its core mission. This transformation must also take place even as debt-burdened European Allies emerge from the COVID-19 catastrophe (for in economic terms that is what it is). **Beyond the rhetoric the only way to realise the NATO 2030 Agenda will be to approach the challenge of deterring, defending, securing and engaging across the entirety of the Euro-Atlantic Area in much the same way as the Allies did in 1949.** Back then NATO faced three hundred plus divisions of Stalin's Red Army demanding of European Allies still ravaged by World War Two a supreme effort because that is what it took to preserve the peace.

## SMOKE AND ERRORS?

To be a credible Alliance mission statement the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept must first and foremost demonstrate the political will to ensure that the NATO 2030 Agenda is fully implemented. At the heart of the Concept a clear commitment is needed to a deterrence and defence posture that is demonstrably credible through the matching of Alliance capabilities, capacities, structures, and above all technologies, to the threat NATO must deter. Anything less will simply be more smoke and errors. In other words, NATO's future credibility rests on the establishment and maintenance of a minimum deterrent able to prevail in all and any circumstances. It must be built on the Warfighting Concept and Deterrence Concept established in the Brussels Summit Communique and which are at the heart of the vital Defence and Deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) and 2019 Military Strategy. Any such level of strategic ambition must also include the political courage to face NATO's worst-case nightmare; the possibility that the United States will be forced to engage in engineered and simultaneous major military emergencies in the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, the Arctic and, of course, Europe.

**Above all, NATO Agenda 2030 demands recognition that in spite of post-COVID 19 economic pressures much of the transformation needed to realise a credible future Alliance deterrence and defence posture will need to come from European. One reason for the failure of Afghan forces was they were too reliant on US forces. The same goes for Europeans.**

Deterrence essentially concerns the communication of will and capability to adversaries. The test of NATO 2030 will not be the inputs Allies make, but the defence outputs they collectively generate relative to the scale and scope of the threats they face. That means a clear understanding and a genuine commitment to ensure the rapid fielding of advanced equipment and technologies so that NATO Europe really has the forces and resources it will need to fulfil its missions and obligations to all of its citizens from Reykjavik to Riga. That, in turn, will require NATO leaders to address two critical questions: what does NATO lack and what does NATO need to be able to continue to fulfil its mission by 2030? This is not the first time such an exercise has been undertaken. In December 1967, the *Future Tasks of the Alliance* report led by Pierre Harmel called on NATO to adopt a 'dual track' approach that would both maintain demonstrably sound defence whilst seeking purposeful dialogue. Critically, the Harmel Report was agreed by the North Atlantic Council in the same year as MC 14/3 "*The Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Area*". Together, Harmel and MC 14/3 led to a new Allied defence and deterrence posture, entitled Flexible Response. In a sense, what is needed today is a nothing short of a new form of Flexible Response, *Flexible Response 2022*.

## **FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 2022, THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND THE NATO 2030**

To realise *Flexible Response 2022*, the NATO 2030 Agenda will need to realise five critical outcomes. Firstly, a first-responder, high-end, manoeuvre force of Europeans sufficiently capable of deterring and defending should the Americans be unable to maintain sufficient strength in Europe. Second,

a NATO European force of sufficient size and capacity that it can ALSO support 'front-line' Allies to NATO's south in their efforts to deal with dangerous instability. Third, effective crisis management built on resolve and strength. To that end, the European Allies, together with the EU, must rebuild conflict management mechanisms undermined by the debacle in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya, not to mention Mali and the Sahel. This will better enable dialogue and engagement as part of a fused crisis management and co-operative security mandate. Fourth, Europe must get over Brexit before it seriously harms NATO. Much of the effort will be driven by Europe's so-called 'Big Three', Britain, France and Germany working together. For that to happen toxic post-Brexit tensions between the three will need to be eased. Fifth, an accommodation must be reached with Turkey so that the Alliance is not repeatedly held hostage by Ankara's concerns about the EU and tensions with Greece and over Cyprus. That will be easier said than done but the alternative is the progressive de-institutionalisation of European defence and transatlantic relations and the steady erosion of the Alliance as the place where political and strategic consultations take place.

The specific political challenges implicit in the 2002 Strategic Concept will be to agree the priorities for the NATO 2030 task-list, together with the forging of a meaningful EU-NATO strategic partnership worthy of the name. NATO 2030 will fail if a commitment to modernise deterrence and defence is not matched by pan-European efforts to strengthen societal resilience and consequence management across the hybrid, cyber, hyperwar mosaic with eighty percent of that effort civilian-led. Indeed, improved resilience will be vital because societal resilience is the *sine qua non* of deterrence. Allied deterrence, which is the core of NATO business, will simply not be credible if open societies remain open to, and/or unable to recover from, potentially catastrophic weapons of mass disruption 'grey zone' attacks.

Perhaps the most critical challenge will be to preserve NATO's technological edge. The new civil-military Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (or DIANA) is an important step forward. However, DIANA also begs a question: what edge? Most European armed forces have been fast falling

behind their US, as well as Chinese and Russian counterparts, for well over a decade if not two. It will be no easy task to reverse a trend that looks increasingly like a form of Euro-isolationism. For example, whilst there have been modest increases in defence expenditure since 2014 the European Defence Agency stated in January 2021 that, "In 2019, defence research and technology (R&T) spending amounted to €1.7 billion, marking an increase of 13% compared to 2018. However, unlike total defence spending which now surpasses 2007 levels, investment in defence R&T is much slower to recover and remains roughly €380 million below its 2007 high. Investment in defence R&T remains insufficient and member states fall collectively short of reaching the collective benchmark of spending 2% of their total defence expenditure on defence R&T. Although 2019 saw a modest rise with 0.9% allocated, up from 0.8% in 2018, no member state achieved the 2% benchmark with only four nations spending more than 1% of their total defence expenditure on defence R&T".<sup>5</sup> To realise NATO 2030 it is precisely defence R&T collaboration that will be needed.

Given that future war will require a future defence the fundamental 2030 requirement for NATO Europeans will be the extent and pace they can field the technologies of future war: hypersonic missile systems, drone swarms and their supporting artificial intelligence, robust space-based and air-breathing surveillance systems, Nano-technologies, but above all, secure ultra-fast semi-automated command systems. All of the above will also rely on machine-learning and big data processes such as super-computing and in time quantum computing. This is because weapons systems, both offensive and defensive, are going to become ever more artificially intelligent. Is such a challenge even understood by those European leaders who have signed up to NATO 2030? I suspect not.

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<sup>5</sup> <https://eda.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/2021/01/28/european-defence-spending-hit-new-high-in-2019>

## RULES OF THE ROAD

NATO's mission is to preserve the peace. However, implicit in that mission is an increasingly contested effort to uphold the rules-based international order. Any such order is vital if arms control is to again become part of sound defence strategy. Central to such an effort will be the fostering of partnerships that promote political and strategic stability. **NATO's Open Door policy is, in effect, a mechanism for promoting stabilisation partnerships in NATO's 'immediate neighbourhood' which might in time lead to eventual membership.** The 'stuff' of those partnerships is defence capacity-building. Boosting training and capacity-building helps to operationalise stability partnerships and thus a more stable NATO 'neighbourhood' by assisting like-minded states to strengthen counter-terrorism, reinforce their political and security stability, defend against hybrid attacks, and improve crisis management, peacekeeping and security sector reform based on that most powerful of Allied 'weapons' NATO Standards.

Strategic partnerships are very different to stability partnerships but equally important. Coalition operations in Afghanistan relied for much of the effort on close working relationship with many non-NATO partners. Those relationships must not be lost. Strategic partnerships with democracies the world over also demonstrate the extent to which the Alliance must be seen in a global context, because of the challenge posed by China and Russia to the world order and the continuing threat from fundamentalism.

There are also dangers to the Alliance implicit in the NATO 2030 Agenda. Combatting and adapting to climate change, and with it a *NATO Action Plan on Climate Change and Security*, is all well and good, but is it really the responsibility or the stuff of Alliance? **The danger is that climate change will be become little more than Alliance virtue-signalling and divert critical and constrained resources away from NATO's core mission. Indeed, NATO and its European armed forces are simply too small to have much impact on climate change.** There is also a real danger that imposing yet more constraints on already constrained armed forces will hand critical comparative advantage to adversaries who are not as 'virtuous'. Yes,

**“climate change is a “defining challenge of our time”, as the Agenda attests, but it is not NATO’s defining challenge which remains first and foremost credible deterrence and defence.**

If the greening of NATO does indeed, “...accelerate its adapting to continue to operate in all conditions, including extreme heat and cold, rising sea levels, and natural disasters. NATO will play its part in reducing military emissions”, and that, “Greening militaries offers real win-wins, by decreasing dependence on fossil fuel supplies, to improve operational effectiveness”, then, again, all well and good. The danger, instead, is that it will simply act as a ‘tax’ on NATO military effectiveness at a time of crisis.<sup>6</sup>

Money matters! It is where NATO 2030 Agenda and the 2022 Strategic Concept meet that the NATO rubber will really hit the gritty road of strategic reality. The NATO 2030 Agenda calls on the Alliance to commit the “right resources” to realise the NATO 2030 Agenda, through national defence expenditure and common funding against the backdrop of post-COVID economic duress and indebtedness. The hard truth is there is a limit to what can be done with so-called ‘efficiency savings’. That is why the Agenda rightly calls for increased resources across three NATO budgets: military, civil, and infrastructure (See CEPA *Moving Mountains for European Defense* <https://cepa.org/the-cepa-military-mobility-project-moving-mountains-for-europes-defense/>).

The Brussels Summit Communique also noted that, “We have made considerable progress since the Wales Summit with seven consecutive years of real growth in non-US defence expenditure, which reinforces our shared responsibility to provide capabilities to the Alliance. All Allies have increased the amount they spend on defence in real terms and this trend is set to continue. Since 2014, European Allies and Canada will have added 260 billion US dollars by the end of this year. Furthermore, ten Allies are expected to spend

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<sup>6</sup> [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf)

2% or more of GDP on defence this year. About two-thirds of Allies plan to reach or exceed the 2% guideline by 2024. Additionally, 24 Allies are spending more than 20% of their defence expenditures on major equipment, including related research and development, and, according to their national plans, 27 Allies will meet the 20% guideline by 2024<sup>7</sup>. Ok, but is it enough? Again, power is relative and what matters is not absolute defence investment, but relative defence outcomes. If one examines such expenditures not simply as nominal increases on defence budgets but instead use military power purchasing parity as the metric for comparison then NATO Europe still lags dangerously behind China and Russia, and is falling ever further behind the US, increases or no.

## WARFIGHTER NATO?

“ **NATO is a warfighting, defensive Alliance or it is nothing.** ”

At the start of this policy paper I posed the question does the Alliance have the political will and military wherewithal to successfully organise for the multi-domain fight for which it must prepare if NATO is to mount credible deterrence and defence? For that to happen the leaders must first understand just what they have signed up to, what it means for them and their citizens, and thereafter demonstrate a willingness to prepare for a future war precisely to prevent it. That is the essence of deterrence and NATO's core mission. If one discards all the peripheral issues in the Communique there were in fact only two what might be called 'Big Ticket' items germane to that mission. First, the invitation to Secretary General Stoltenberg to lead the drafting of the next Strategic Concept and the implicit agreement to give the 2019 NATO Military Strategy the go-ahead through the Warfighting and Deterrence Concepts.

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<sup>7</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en)

Fulfilling the Military Strategy will be the foundation upon which both the NATO 2030 Agenda and the 2022 Strategic Concept must necessarily stand. This is because the Military Strategy is inherently multi-domain and covers all known and anticipated threats, including likely military developments from the seabed to space and across air, sea, land, cyber, information and knowledge dominance. This is the clear inference of Paragraph 21 of the Brussels Communiqué with its renewed emphasis on Collective Defence, and Paragraph 22, the political commitment, which calls for the ‘full and speedy implementation of the Deterrence Concept and a Warfighting Concept. Both commitments will be meaningless unless they also lead to an additional commitment to further strengthen the NATO Force Structure and the test of leaders’ commitment to realise such a strategy will be its centrality or otherwise in the Strategic Concept.

What will that mean in practice for NATO’s European forces? Critically, the Deterrence Concept will only be credible if it is properly supported by the Warfighting Concept and its future war ethos of combined ‘all arms’ cognitive superiority, layered resilience, influence and power projection, cross-domain command and integrated multi-domain defence. The credibility of both concepts will depend on the Alliance’s willingness to face up to threats as they are, not how much threat the Allies think they can afford, because deterrence rests on a demonstrable relationship between offensive threat and defensive capability across the entirety of NATO’s Area of Responsibility. Critically, only a proper grip of the threat curve will enable NATO forces to continuously adapt (adaptation is a process not an event) and thus generate the kind of critical military and technological edge NATO itself says is vital to the Alliance’s modernising deterrence and defence posture.

All of the above pre-supposes NATO and its nations agree about the changing nature and character of warfare. Multi-domain warfare is a deep joint warfighting concept designed to apply all forms of firepower. It is both kinetic and non-kinetic and designed to achieve superiority across the Area of Responsibility (AOR) and beyond, even in the face of strategic competitors applying disruptive and destructive pressure across the conflict spectrum.



Both Beijing and Moscow are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their ability to deny access to Allied forces and interrupt command chains, information flows, logistics and military mobility. At the very least, NATO the Military Strategy must also properly addresses AOR-wide, multi-domain, multi-speed capabilities now entering the Russian order of battle, particularly its spearhead forces in the Central and Western Military Districts (Oblast). To complement that effort all NATO Allies must a re-grip a methodology for intense warfighting together with a theory of victory founded on good intelligence and which properly exploits and organises the growing ability of Alliance forces to focus effects from across all domains of military engagement, at ever greater ranges, and at ever increasing speed. This is a particularly important skill-set if the Alliance is really to deter and/or over-match Russia whilst also undertaking effective counter terrorism operations, the only two officially endorsed threats facing the Alliance.

The key to all of the above will be a sufficiency of Allied fighting power, allied to a demonstrable sufficiency of combat-ready forces able to provide a wide range of conventional military effects. Such fighting power will be central to a new deterrence mix across the hybrid, cyber, hyperwar mosaic, including nuclear deterrence. Any such NATO force must also be demonstrably capable of acting dynamically at the so-called speed of relevance and of sufficient mass and twenty-first century manoeuvre to enable credible deterrence in all contingencies, including the worst-case. Critically, the massive bulk of any such NATO future force must be European – an Allied Command Operations NATO Heavy Mobile Force. However, to realise any such European force will require a sea-change in Alliance thinking and concerted action across collective defence, crisis management and co-operative security missions by all of NATO Europe. That is the implicit challenge in the Brussels Summit Communiqué when it states that NATO needs, “...a flexible, agile, and resilient multi-domain force architecture, with the right forces, in the right place at the right time”.<sup>8</sup> The Warfighting Concept also visualises the complex nature

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<sup>8</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en)

of modern warfare as a contest. **To be credible Allied deterrence must demonstrate and communicate an intelligence-led and unambiguous ability to defend, and any such defence will again depend on an ability to control geographic areas and the multiple domains of warfare simultaneously. Words must now be followed by action, Europe.**

At the heart of the NATO 2030 challenge is the need for a preparedness to fight allied to much improved readiness of forces and resources so that they can be committed early and fast to any fight. It is precisely here that the concept of multi-domain operations is most persuasive as both a way to fight and as a theory of victory. However, such an approach will test both NATO adaptation and, indeed, experimentation to the full and will not be an easy goal to attain. For example, *Exercise Warfighter 4-21* simulated large scale multi-domain combat operations at corps level against an extremely capable and lethal combined arms enemy with both mass and muscle to test the (re-) emerging US theory of victory. During the exercise the British division that was taking part used up its entire stock of ammunition in eight days. What then?

For deterrence to work NATO systematically undermine all of the assumptions about the fight in the minds of any enemy. To that end, the Americans are pioneering the concept of 'convergence' to rapidly integrate effects across all domains and at great distance to overmatch an enemy and create windows of opportunity that can be exploited. If NATO European forces are to be part of such developments interoperability with the US future force will remain the *sine qua non* of the future NATO. NATO will thus also have to adopt 'convergence' and another facet of US best practice by testing NATO European forces to failure during both exercising and training. As an observer on NATO exercises I have too often seen victory snatched from the jaws of implausibility. It is only by facing up to failure that so-called 'golden lessons' can be learnt. Again, such a willingness to embrace failure will demand of NATO a significant cultural and mind-set change from top to bottom. The 'learning' generated by such efforts will be critical if the right approaches are to be embedded in the 2022 Strategic Concept and thus drive the modernisation of Alliance deterrence and defence.

There is an irony in all of the above. Many of the lessons for NATO implicit in *Warfighter 4-21* are not new even if much of the technology is. The concept of All Arms Battle (for that is what it is) has been around since the August 1918 Battle of Amiens and the lessons for NATO are pretty much the same as those for the successful British commanders then: if NATO fails to generate sufficient and relevant combat power both deterrence and defence will fail. In other words, whether the Strategic Concept and the NATO 2030 Agenda are to be one day deemed successful rests not on the quality of the language, but the relevance and scope of the fighting power they lead to and the order of battle. If a sufficient level of contextually-relevant and technologically-enabled fighting power is generated, properly generated, commanded and controlled commensurate with the maintenance of a credible minimum deterrent credible in the third decade of the twenty-first century then NATO will be fit for its essential purpose – maintaining the peace and freedom of all of its members. Only then will it be apparent that the Alliance does indeed have the political will and military wherewithal to successfully organise for the multi-domain fight that it now faces. The spirit might be willing but...?

## THE NATO EUROPEAN FUTURE FORCE

There is a hard 2021 truth implicit in all of the above: NATO is ultimately a European institution for the benefit of Europeans and, therefore,



**responsibility for NATO's future must ultimately rest squarely with Europeans.**

President Biden would certainly seem to think so and President Trump clearly did. A trend? Therefore, both the Strategic Concept and the NATO 2030 Agenda will do the Alliance a great service if they help the Allies successfully confront perhaps the hardest of NATO's many hard realities: the NATO Europe future force. If not, and the short-termism of European politics trumps the longer-termism demanded for Europe's future defence, the NATO 2030 Agenda and

the 2022 Strategic Concept will become yet another of those now many exercises in political self-deception in which the appearance of cohesion is given more importance than generating credible defence and deterrence and effective security engagement. As the author of three major strategic and operational reports between 2008 and 2014 on the campaign in Afghanistan I saw the damage such self-delusion can do.

Furthermore, the tragedy in Afghanistan is the clearest signal yet of the growing domestic and global pressures on US foreign and security policy. Therefore, for the still-vital transatlantic relationship to continue to function, and NATO with it, Europeans will need to do far more for their own defence, and become better able to support the Americans when they so choose. Strategic autonomy? Moreover, in the wake of Afghanistan the political emphasis will now be on deterrence, but it must be REAL deterrence. The danger is that 'deterrence' will again become another metaphor for doing nothing because the thing about deterrence is that it only fails when it is tested.

## **NATO 2030 AND RIGA CONFERENCE 2021**

The core message of this Riga Conference Policy Paper is both simple and challenging. **By 2030 NATO must develop a strong European pillar built around a European first responder, high-end future force (EFF) that is able to deter and defend against threats, support Allies, and sufficiently strong to convince the US to remain engaged in the defence of Europe.**

However, to realise such a force the Alliance must overcome a range of profound challenges that can no longer be glossed over for the sake of political politesse. The state of NATO's defences are far weaker than many realise and trust between the Allies is at a low ebb. However, in spite of the tensions and the many domestic challenges the Allies face the refusal of the European Allies to face acknowledged threats would be profoundly dangerous, particularly the growing threat posed by the authoritarian powers and the strategic consequences of the Sino-Russian strategic alignment.

Therefore, European leaders and peoples need to once again understand the vital and continuing role of military power in the preservation of Europe's peace, and that leadership from NATO's so-called "big capitals" will be crucial to any such effort. However, it will all count for nought if not sufficiently invested with a high levels of strategic ambition and political capital. There have been significant achievements in modernising NATO's conventional deterrent, particularly Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), but there are also huge gaps in the capability and capacity of the Alliance that need to be addressed and urgently. Greater and faster progress is also needed towards improving military mobility, which will also require agreement over civilian capability targets which has proven elusive. Critically, NATO needs to re-visit the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge (DIP) because if the European Allies are either unwilling or unable to afford the NATO 2030 they need as part of a collective effort, would they really be willing to adopt a more integrated approach, or simply live with the risk of not being defended?

One final consideration. There will be some within the Alliance who will regard the strategic ambition implicit in this paper as unrealistic. Some will claim the measures outlined above are already in hand when in reality the pace of change is so glacial as to be irrelevant. They will place the maintenance of political cohesion above the need to meet fast, emerging and extant strategic threats and challenges. It is such critics who are unrealistic. Time is fast running out for the political sophistry of Europe's self-justifying, weakness-obsessed, isolationist, soft power elite. Consequently, there could well come a day when a fixation on maintaining lowest common denominator 'political cohesion' will be revealed for what it is; little more than a form of appeasement, the maintenance of a hollowed-out NATO that deters few if any of its contemptuous enemies.

Therefore, if NATO is not imbued with an aggregated strategic ambition credibly symmetrical to the threats it must deter, and perhaps one-day defeat, then NATO 2030 will be a paper tiger and will die. **If both NATO 2030 and the 2022 Strategic Concept are to add any real value to the future NATO they must first and foremost challenge the culture in which the conveniences of short-term politics routinely trumps sound strategy.** At the very least, the 2022 Strategic Concept must honestly re-state NATO's fundamental

purpose for a new and possibly dangerous age: to credibly and capably deter and defend against all threats to the Euro-Atlantic Area in a twenty-first century that could be just as tumultuous as the twentieth if NATO fails. Do you understand that, leaders? Really?

## TRUST THE PEOPLE

Transparency is one of the greatest strengths of democracy and the only reason for such secrecy is that Allied leaders either do not understand or believe in them, do not want to be held publicly accountable to them, or both. **NATO needs to be brought out of the shadows so that a much wider public can see the critical work the Alliance does on their behalf but too often in the past NATO's public diplomacy has been more about papering over the cracks within than part of sustained constructive outreach.** Far more transparency could be permitted into the work conducted so far by SACEUR and his team, so that it can be more widely debated and better understood. In the past two years SHAPE has established a good plan for deterrence, defence and projecting stability, but it is barely known or understood outside military circles. For example, the Defence and Deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) are framework documents so why do they have to be secret, given that General Gerasimov and other adversaries will certainly have copies?

Furthermore, SACEUR and his team have done great work adapting NATO for the future. However, there is also a very real danger that far from setting ambitious goals for the Alliance Strategic Concept 2022 could set NATO into reverse if Allied leaders use it to impose yet more constraints on SHAPE's ability to prepare the Alliance for future reality simply to avoid any domestic political embarrassment. Public transparency would protect against such nonsense by enabling open debate and better communicate what has already been agreed. Transparency will not only be critical for reinforcing deterrence it will also start the long march back to self-belief and public trust in NATO that is so desperately needed in the wake of the Afghanistan defeat.

## CITIUS, ALTIUS, FORTIUS?

If NATO 2030 is to continue to fulfil its mission the 2021 Afghanistan fiasco must be seen for what it is, a strategic inflection point for the Alliance. Time is pressing. If the European Allies fail to act then NATO could well cease to be a defence alliance and become little more than an agency for military standardisation. Such a failure would mark the beginning of a dangerous end, and the greatest threat of all to Europe's continued peace.

This paper has been necessarily blunt because in the wake of the Afghanistan fiasco our Alliance can no longer continue down the path of self-delusion that has for too long been steadily eroding NATO's credibility. Such a loss of credibility may not matter much to the citizens of Berlin, London, Paris Washington because they are unlikely to pay the price for such a retreat. However, it does and will matter to the citizens of Riga because it is they and their fellows along NATO's eastern flank who could well one day pay a terrible price unless we all change and change together.

Afghanistan failed not simply because President Biden acted on his own simplistic, pre-ordained prejudice to end what he called America's 'forever wars'. The campaign also failed because too many Europeans not only refused to recognise the Black Elephants and Swans in NATO's room, but were actively breeding them by refusing to heed warnings about the dangers posed by the lack of unity of effort and purpose. In 2012, that is exactly the warning I issued in a major report for the Commander, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (COMARRC) on what was happening in Afghanistan. Many of the failings that led to the August 2021 defeat were apparent then and should have been apparent now. At the end of a 2007 report I wrote the following: "Some countries forgive mediocrity. Afghanistan is no such country". Let me paraphrase that for 2021 and beyond: "Some eras may forgive NATO mediocrity. This is no such era". No more self-delusion!

THE LATVIAN TRANSATLANTIC ORGANISATION  
(LATO) IN ACTION



## LATO

LATO is a non-governmental organisation established in 2000. Its aims are to inform the public about NATO and Latvia's membership in the Alliance, to organise informative public events about Latvian and Euro-Atlantic security issues, to promote partnerships with other countries, to lay the foundations for Latvia's international role as a member of NATO, and to foster the international community's understanding of Latvia's foreign and security policy aims. During the past 20 years, LATO has numerous achievements to be proud of. LATO organises the most influential security conference in the Baltic Sea region: The Rīga Conference facilitates discussion about issues affecting the transatlantic community and annually gathers international experts in foreign affairs and security/defence matters, policy makers, journalists, and business representatives. LATO promotes policy relevant research on topics such as gender equality, peace and security, resilience in the borderland, and the subjective perception of security. A series of various initiatives intended for increasing the interest of Latvian, Baltic and European youth in security related issues have been put in motion, including an annual future leader's forum and masterclasses for young political leaders. LATO's most recent project is the Secure Baltics platform, which serves as an information hub for those who are eager to join the debate on international security.

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## SECURE BALTICS

LATO has launched a new internet platform SecureBaltics ([www.securebaltics.eu](http://www.securebaltics.eu)). The site gathers different materials – policy briefs, discussions, interviews, studies, educational materials – created in the framework of the Rīga Conference, as well as work from our partners. It is a stable platform that the Rīga Conference community can rely on and use as a credible source of information in the region.

## **Purpose**

The purpose of the platform is to collect the know-how that is generated by the excellent minds gathered at the Rīga Conference on an annual basis. The Rīga Conference gathers regional and international experts in foreign policy and defence, academics, journalists, and business representatives by promoting the discussions on issues affecting the transatlantic community. It has been growing in influence since its inception in 2006.

Every year, for two days the National Library of Latvia is the centre of the most important regional discussions on security issues. However, it is not enough to engage in these discussions only once a year. Therefore, LATO developed SecureBaltics as a practical tool which can encourage the use of any resources and materials that have been produced as part of the Rīga Conference or its follow-up events.

## **Reach**

The platform tries to provide materials in both, English and Latvian, in order to reach multiple audiences. It is intended for the traditional Rīga Conference community of opinion leaders and experts in foreign policy and defence matters as well as any other interested parties that could benefit from the generated materials such as high school teachers looking for study materials.

## **Vision**

LATO hopes that SecureBaltics will become the go-to hub for resource associated with defence and security issues in the Baltics within the next few years.

## **Materials**

The platform SecureBaltics provides resources:

- For all interested parties, including expert community, in the form of interviews, policy briefs, commentaries on topical issues
- For teachers and lecturers in the form of study materials and tests that can be included in academic curriculum
- For students in the form of lectures and study materials, as well as interactive study materials through games.

## **Partners**

The SecureBaltics portal is supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia.

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In November 2017 he co-published the *The Future Tasks of the Adapted Alliance* with General John R. Allen, Admiral Giampaolo di Paola and Ambassador Sandy Vershbow. In March 2021 he will publish a major new book for Oxford University entitled *Future War and the Defence of Europe* with US General (Ret.) John Allen and US LTG (Ret.) Frederick (Ben) Hodges.



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